Human Rights Protection during the War on Terror: Two Steps Back, One Step Forward by Darcy, Shane
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Journal of International Law
2007
Human Rights Protection during the War on
Terror: Two Steps Back, One Step Forward
Shane Darcy
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota
Journal of International Law collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Darcy, Shane, "Human Rights Protection during the War on Terror: Two Steps Back, One Step Forward" (2007). Minnesota Journal of
International Law. 231.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjil/231
Cite as: 16 MINN. J. INT'L L. 353
Human Rights Protection during the "War
on Terror": Two Steps Back, One Step
Forward
Shane Darcy*
The aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001 has
seen a concerted and sustained rolling-back of many of the
fundamental human rights guarantees protected by
international law. In the name of security, several States have
engaged in practices such as torture, indefinite detention,
disappearance and the denial of fair trial rights. The rules of
international humanitarian law have also been violated, with
some of the central protections denied to persons designated as
"unlawful combatants." It has also been claimed that some
contemporary legal norms are a hindrance to the pursuit of the
"war on terror." John Reid, the United Kingdom's Secretary of
State for Defense, has openly questioned the adequacy of
international law to deal with the contemporary threat from
"international terrorists," specifically identifying the 1949
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols as part of an
international framework which he perceives as not having
adapted to changing circumstances.' Since September 11th,
there has been an assault on both the human rights of
individual persons and on the corpus of laws that seeks to
protect those rights.
Lecturer, Transitional Justice Institute, University of Ulster.
1. John Reid, MP, Sec'y of State for Def., Address at the Royal United Services
Inst. for Def. & Sec. Studies, 20th-Century Rules, 21st-Century Conflict (Apr. 06,
2006), http://www.mod.uk/Defencelnternet/DefenceNews/DefencePolicyAndBusiness
/ReidAddressesRusiOn20thcenturyRules2lstcenturyConflict.htm (last visited Feb.
11, 2007). See also Tony Blair, British Prime Minister, Prime Minister's Press
Conference (Aug. 5, 2005), http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/page804l.asp
(stating that the "rules of the game are changing" with regard to measures to be
taken in the fight against terrorism) (last visited Feb. 11, 2007).
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In a perverse way, however, the "war on terror" has
provided some opportunity to affirm existing human rights
obligations and to increase somewhat the scope of human rights
protection. In particular, recent events have clarified aspects of
the debate surrounding the application of international human
rights law extraterritorially and during times of armed conflict.
Through the lens of the ongoing Al-Skeini proceedings before
the United Kingdom courts, in which the Court of Appeal has
decided that both the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European
Convention on Human Rights apply to persons detained by
British forces in Iraq,2 this article explores how the search for
accountability has led to human rights law applying alongside
the traditional legal framework of international humanitarian
law in certain wartime circumstances. The Al-Skeini case is one
of the first in which domestic courts have confirmed the
extraterritorial application of human rights law to a State's own
agents during a time of armed conflict. These decisions have
also highlighted some of the profound challenges that are
presented by the application of human rights law during armed
conflict and how much remains to be done to resolve the
complex inter-relationship between international humanitarian
law and human rights. 3
One such dilemma, which is the particular focus of this
article, is the exact scope of a State's extraterritorial human
rights obligations and the meaning of "effective control"--the
standard that is commonly used to trigger the application of
human rights treaties beyond a State's own borders.4 The
article will consider the reasoning of both the High Court and
the Court of Appeal in the Al-Skeini case, which involved a
narrower understanding of "effective control" than that as found
by international and regional human rights bodies. It asks,
furthermore, whether this control requirement is automatically
satisfied where there is an occupation under the laws of armed
conflict, given that it was accepted by all parties in the
proceedings that the United Kingdom was an occupying power
in the Basrah area of Iraq at the time. The article begins with a
2. A-Skeini v. Sec'yof State for the Def., [20041 EWHC (Admin) 2911, [289]-
[2451; A1-Skeini v. Secyof State for Def., [2005] EWCA (civ) 1609, [31]-[178].
3. See generally RENA PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS AND
HUMANITARIAN LAw (2002). On the challenges see Noam Lubell, Challenges in
Applying Human Rights Law to Armed Conflict, 87 INT'L. REV. RED CROSS 737
(2005); David P. Stewart, Human Rights, Terrorism and International Law, 50 VILL.
L. REV. 685, 697-98 (2005).
4. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
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discussion of the jurisdiction of human rights treaties generally
and some instances in which the extraterritorial application of
those instruments has come about.
I. EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES
As with all international treaties, the jurisdiction of human
rights treaties is generally provided for within the treaty itself.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights obliges
each States party to respect and to ensure the rights in the
Covenant "to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction."5 Article 1 of the European Convention on Human
Rights makes no reference to territory, providing that rights
and freedoms shall be secured to everyone "within [the]
jurisdiction" of the High Contracting Parties.6 The American
Convention on Human Rights likewise talks of persons "subject
to [the] jurisdiction" of State parties to it. 7 Other international
human rights treaties such as the Convention on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Convention
against Torture use the phrase "territory under [the]
jurisdiction" of a State party.8 The crux of these provisions,
therefore, is that the human rights obligations of a State will be
owed primarily to those persons on the territory of the State,
but that such obligations also arise for those persons who are
otherwise within that State's jurisdiction, such as those in the
power of State agents abroad. Human rights obligations can be
said to arise both at home and away.9
In and of itself extraterritorial jurisdiction is not a
controversial doctrine. International law provides for several
jurisdictional bases in addition to territory, including universal
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction based on nationality. The
5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, para. 1, Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (emphasis added).
6. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
7. American Convention on Human Rights: Pact of San Jos6, Costa Rica art.
1, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
8. International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination art.
3, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment Art. 2, para. 1, Dec. 10, 1984,
1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
9. See generally EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
(Fons Coomans & Menno Kamminga eds., 2004).
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application of treaties of international humanitarian law during
international armed conflicts will invariably involve one State
exercising jurisdiction outside of its own territory. 10 In the
realm of international criminal law, the International Criminal
Court has jurisdiction over crimes committed on the territory of
a States party or by nationals of that State, regardless of where
the crimes were committed.11 The responsibility of States for
internationally wrongful acts frequently arises for actions
carried out beyond a State's own borders. 12
Given the almost unique nature of a State's human rights
obligations, particularly when compared to those accruing to it
under international humanitarian law or criminal law, it is not
surprising there has been some reluctance on the part of States
to concede to extraterritorial human rights obligations, but not,
it must be said, any outright rejection of the concept. Least
problematically, States have accepted that their diplomatic and
consular staff abroad must act in accordance with the State's
human rights obligations.' 3  But animosity towards the
extraterritorial application of human rights treaties arises
beyond this context and becomes particularly acute when the
context is one of an armed conflict. States have commonly
argued that international human rights law was brought into
existence in order to regulate the relationship between a State
and its own citizens and, furthermore, that it is a concept that is
applicable in peacetime only. 14 In a time of war, they would
view international humanitarian law as the only legal
framework to guide the conduct of belligerents. In 2003, the
U.S. Department of Defense pronounced its view that the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights "does not
apply outside the United States or its special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction, and that it does not apply to operations
10. Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (specifying that the Convention
shall apply "to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may
arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties") (emphasis added).
11. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 12, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(1998).
12. See generally Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third
session (2001).
13. As noted by the European Court of Human Rights in Bankovie v. Belgium,
2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333, 356.
14. Michael J. Dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially
in Times of Armed Conflict and Military Occupation, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 119, 119-20
(Jan. 2005).
[Vol. 16:2
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE "WAR ON TERROR"
of the military during an international armed conflict." 15
With increasing frequency however, prominent
international bodies, including the International Court of
Justice, have ruled that a State's human rights obligations can
extend beyond its own borders and that human rights law
applies at all times, including in times of armed conflict. The
United Nations Human Rights Committee has held that "a
State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the
Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that
State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State
Party."1 6 In line with this disjunctive interpretation of the
jurisdiction provision of the Covenant, the Committee found
that Uruguay violated its obligations under the treaty when its
agents abducted a Uruguayan national from Argentina. 7
Similarly, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
found that the United States had acted contrary to the
American Declaration of Human Rights with regard to the
mistreatment of persons detained during the invasion of
Grenada. 8 In its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the International Court of Justice
pronounced that "the protection of the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights does not cease in times of war," 9 and
the Court has shown little hesitancy recently in holding States
responsible for the violation of their extraterritorial human
rights obligations during times of armed conflict. 20
In times of armed conflict, therefore, both international
humanitarian law and human rights law can apply. The
Human Rights Committee has taken the view that "both
15. Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on
Terrorism; Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations
(Mar. 6, 2003), available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/un/2004/
mar03torturememotext.htm.
16. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31: The Nature of the
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 10, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (May 26, 2004).
17. L6pez Burgos v. Uruguay, Commc'n No. R.12/52, T 12, U.N. Doc. Supp. No.
40 (A/36/40), at 176 (1981).
18. Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 109/99,
37 (2001).
19. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, 240 (July 8).
20. See, e.g., Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 1 (Dec. 19); Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9).
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spheres of law are complementary, not mutually exclusive" 21
and the International Court of Justice has confirmed that the
maxim lex specialis derogat generali should be used to resolve
any conflict between the two branches of law.22 It should be
noted that certain human rights obligations may be derogated
from if the armed conflict in question amounts to a "public
emergency which threatens the life of the nation."23 The various
human rights treaties place stringent restrictions on the power
of States to derogate and a number of specific human rights can
never be disregarded during a state of emergency. 4
There is now a growing jurisprudence of various
international and regional human rights and judicial bodies
confirming that human rights law can apply extraterritorially
and during wartime. And as one commentator has put it, "the
resisters [to this development] are fighting a losing battle and
should lay down their arms and accept the applicability of
human rights law in times of armed conflict."25 The United
Kingdom courts have recently joined the ranks of those
upholding the application of human rights obligations overseas
during conflict. Several cases have been taken under the
Human Rights Act 1998, the domestic legislation which has
21. General Comment No. 31, supra note 16, 11.
22. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 19;
Legality Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, supra note 20, at 178. For a discussion of the Court's approach to this
issue, see Louise Doswald-Beck, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Are There
Some Individuals Bereft of All Legal Protection?, 98 ASIL PROC. 353, 353-55 (2004);
SHANE DARCY, COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 176-79 (2007).
23. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4, Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174; European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 220, 232;
American Convention on Human Rights art. 27, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123,
152. Note the observation by Peter Rowe, however, that "it is difficult to accept that
the occupation of the territory [overseas] will show a suitable emergency in the
territory of the occupying State." PETER ROWE, THE IMPACT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAw
ON ARMED FORCES 119 (2006).
24. Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, there can
be no derogation from Article 6 (right to life), Article 7 (freedom from torture, cruel,
inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment), Article 8, T 1-2 (freedom from
slavery and servitude), Article 11 (prohibition of imprisonment for inability to fulfill
a contractual obligation), Article 15 (nullem crimen sine lege), Article 16 (right to
recognition everywhere as a person before the law), and Article 18 (freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion). International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
25. Lubell, supra note 3, at 738. See also Theodor Meron, Extraterritoriality of
Human Rights Treaties, 89 AM. J. IN'L L. 78 (1995).
[Vol. 16:2
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE "WAR ON TERROR"
given effect to the European Convention on Human Rights in
the United Kingdom, with regard to the conduct of British
troops participating in the ongoing conflict in Iraq.
II. THE UNITED KINGDOM CASES
The case of Al-Skeini v. Secretary of State for Defence came
before the High Court in 2004 and involves claims by the
relatives of six Iraqi citizens who died in Basrah during the time
when the United Kingdom was an occupying power there. 26
Five of those persons had been killed in armed incidents
involving British troops, while the sixth, Baha Mousa, was
beaten to death while in custody in a British military prison. 27
The High Court had to consider whether the deaths took place
within the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom, so as to fall
within the scope of the European Convention on Human Rights
and the Human Rights Act 1998, and, if so, whether there was a
breach of the requirements under Articles 2 and 3 of the
Convention. 28
The High Court held that jurisdiction under the European
Convention on Human Rights is "essentially territorial."29
Although the Court held that exceptions to this principle do
exist, such as with regard to embassies or consulates overseas, 30
it felt that there was "complete disagreement as to the width,
nature, rationale and applicability of the exceptions" to this
principle, even within the jurisprudence of the European Court
of Human Rights itself.31  The High Court identified two
jurisdictional bases of relevance to the case in hand: state agent
authority over persons and effective control of an area.32 It
rejected the first five claims on the basis that the United
Kingdom's jurisdiction could not apply to the territory of
another state which is not a party to the European Convention,
even if that territory is in the effective control of the State.33
Iraq was seen as being outside l'espace juridique of the
European Convention on Human Rights. The Court did hold,
26. A1-Skeini v. Sec'y of State for Def., [20051 W.L.R. 1401, 1406 (Q.B.D.).
27. For the facts of each individual case, see id. at 1417-23.
28. Id. at 1407.
29. Id. at 1425, 1471.
30. Id. at 1478.
31. Id. at 1427.
32. See id. at 1472-74.
33. Id. at 1480-82.
20071
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however, that a prison operated in the territory of another State
by a party to the Convention, as in the facts relating to the sixth
claimant, would come within that State's jurisdiction.34 The
Court found that State had not lived up to its requirements to
conduct an adequate investigation into the death of Mousa
under Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention and the
Human Rights Act.35
The first five claimants appealed the High Court decision,
as did the Secretary of State with regard to the applicability of
the Human Rights Act to the death of Mousa and the finding
that there had not been compliance with Articles 2 and 3.36 The
Court of Appeal reiterated the distinction between persons
under the control of state agents overseas and the exercise of
effective control over territory.37 With regard to the latter, it
noted the call of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe that relevant member States accept the full applicability
of the European Convention "to the activities of their forces in
Iraq, in so far as those forces exercised effective control over the
areas in which they operated."38 Considering the first five
victims under the jurisdictional base of "state agent authority,"
the Court found that unlike Baha Mousa, these victims were "at
liberty" when they died, in that none of them "were under the
control and authority ,of British troops at the time when they
were killed."3 9
Lord Justice Brooke, delivering the leading judgment, then
turned to address the question of whether the troops could be
considered in "effective control" of the area of Basrah where the
deaths occurred. 40 He noted the requirements for occupation
under international humanitarian law and the fact that the
Secretary of State had accepted that the United Kingdom was
an occupying power, "at least in those areas of southern Iraq,
and particularly Basrah City, where British troops exercised
34. Id. at 1482-83.
35. Id. at 1496-98.
36. The Queen (on the Application of Mazin Jumaa Gatteh Al Skeini et al.) v.
Sec'y of State for Def., [2006] 3 W.L.R. 508 available at http://www.bailii.org/
ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2005/1609.html. The United Kingdom government now
accepted that the European Convention applied to the Mousa case, but arguing that
the Human Rights Act did not and that the relatives' only avenue was to the
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
37. Id. 91 48.
38. Id. 91 9.
39. Id. IT 109-110.
40. Id. 1 112.
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sufficient authority for this purpose."4 1 Lord Justice Brooke
distinguished this case from those considered by the European
Court of Human Rights with regard to Northern Cyprus and
Moldova, because in those cases:
[Part of the territory of a contracting state was occupied by another
contracting state which had every intention of exercising its control on
a long term basis. The civilian administration of those territories was
under the control of the occupying state, and it deployed sufficient
troops to ensure that its control of the area was effective. 42
He found that the United Kingdom was not in effective control
of the areas in question, given the volatile situation there, the
insufficient numbers of British troops, the inefficiency of local
police, the intimidation of judges and the lack of control over the
civil administration.43 Although an occupying power, it would
be impossible to hold that the United Kingdom was in effective
control of Basrah City for the purposes of applying the
European Convention on Human Rights.
In addition to the material facts, Lord Justice Brooke gave
two other reasons for the conclusion that such "effective control"
was lacking. First, to concede that such control existed would
oblige the United Kingdom to secure to everyone in Basrah the
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the European Convention. 44
Secondly, it was held that it would be wrong to try and promote
the "common spiritual heritage" of Europe in a predominantly
Muslim country.45 While the former reason indicates that there
remain complex issues to be resolved in the application of
human rights law extraterritorially, the latter is quite an
interesting proposition given that the members of the Council of
Europe have continually stressed that Turkey abide by its
obligations under the European Convention.
The United Kingdom courts in the Al-Skeini proceedings
held that British troops in Basrah did not have obligations
under human rights law, as opposed to those accruing under
international humanitarian law, towards the first five
claimants. Importantly though, the Courts did find that the
detained Baha Mousa had been within the jurisdiction of the
41. Id. 11 113-115, 119.
42. Al Skeini, [2006] 3 W.L.R. 120.
43. Id. 121-123.
44. Id. 124; See also The Queen (on the Application of Mazin Jumaa Gatteh
Al Skeini et al. v. Sec'y of State for Def., [2005] 2 W.L.R. 1401, 285.
45. Al Skeini, [2006] 3 W.L.R. 126 (referring to Golder v. United Kingdom, 1
Eur. H.R. Rep. 524, 1 34 (1975)).
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United Kingdom and that there had not been proper compliance
with the State's obligations to protect the right to life and the
freedom from torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. Two
high-standing domestic courts confirmed and applied a State's
human rights obligations to the actions of its agents overseas
and during a time of conflict. This development has opened up
an avenue of redress for victims of human rights violations
committed during wartime and is highly important given the
relatively weak enforcement mechanisms of international
humanitarian law. It is clear that for future military
undertakings the training of members of the armed forces of the
United Kingdom will need to be adjusted in order to take on
board the applicability of human rights law during armed
conflict.46
Although the Al-Skeini decision is of enormous significance,
marking a considerable step forward for the protection of human
rights in the "war on terror," the decision itself, and the
subsequent Al-Jedda case, point to continuing difficulties and
hostility towards the extraterritorial application of human
rights law.47 The Al-Jedda case concerned a citizen of duel
British and Iraqi nationality detained in Iraq as a threat to
security.48 Although the Courts seemed to uphold Al-Skeini in
general terms, they held that in the post-occupation phase, the
rights arising under the Human Rights Act and the European
Convention could be qualified by United Nations Security
Council Resolution 1546 (8 June 2004). This "startling"
proposition by the United Kingdom government, as it was
described in the High Court, 49 was accepted by the courts and is
now being appealed to the House of Lords. The Al-Skeini case is
also on appeal to the House of Lords, particularly with regard to
46. See generally ROWE, supra note 23.
47. For critiques of the decisions see Joanne Williams, Al Skeini: A Flawed
Interpretation of Bankovic, 23 WIS. INT'L L.J. 687 (2005); Rarik Abdel-Monem,
Patrick J.D. Kennedy & Ekaterian Apostolova, R(on the Application of A1-Skeini) v.
Secretary of Defence: A Look at the United Kingdom's Extraterritorial Obligations in
Iraq and Beyond, 17 FLA. J. INT'L L. 345 (2005); see also Michael J. Dennis, Agora:
ICJ Advisory Opinion on Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory: Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times of
Armed Conflict and Military Occupation, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 119 (2005).
48. The Queen (on the Application of Hilal Abdul-Razzaq Ali Al-Jedda) v. Sec'y
of State for Def., [2005] EWHC 1809 (Admin) available at http://www.bailii.orgl
ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2005/1809.html; The Queen (on the Application of Hilal
Abdul-Razzaq Ali Al-Jedda) v. Sec'y of State for Def., [2006] EWCA Civ 327
available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2006/327.html.
49. Al-Jedda, [2006] EWCA Civ 34.
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the deaths of the five persons who were not detained by British
troops when they were killed. The principal ground of appeal
revolves around the holding by the Courts that the United
Kingdom did not have "effective control" over the relevant
territory, with lawyers for the claimants contending that "where
British armed forces personnel are, for example, performing
policing functions, such as home raids, street patrols and
manning check points, they are exercising authority and control
and therefore, the HRA and ECHR should apply."50
III. "EFFECTIVE CONTROL"
In the jurisprudence of international and regional bodies
concerning the extraterritorial application of human rights
obligations, the lynchpin for many decisions has very often been
the presence of effective control by state agents, over either
individual persons or territory. The United Nations Human
Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights in their findings on Israel have stressed this
element of effective control over territories and populations.51
The European Court of Human Rights has also broached the
issue of "effective control" and has provided some guidance as to
its meaning. 52 In a case arising out of Turkey's occupation of
Northern Cyprus, the Court found that the obligations under
the European Convention arose there because the area was
under Turkey's "authority and control."53  The Bankovi6
proceedings, relating to the NATO bombing of a Belgrade
television station in April 1999, resulted in a declaration of
inadmissibility by the Court because it found that it had no
jurisdiction as the victims were not under the effective control of
any of the States parties to the European Convention acting
50. See Public Interest Lawyers Statement,
http://www.publicinterestlawyers.co.uk /cases/cases.php?id=34.
51. See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Israel, U.N.
GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 63d Sess., 1694th mtg. 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93
(1998); Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Report on the Eighteenth and
Nineteenth Sessions, 234, U.N. Doc. E/1999/22 (1999).
52. Tarik Abdel-Monem, How Far do the Lawless Areas of Europe Extend?
Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights, 14 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 159, 2 (2005).
53. Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser A.) at 62 (1995) (preliminary
objections); Assanidze v. Georgia, App. No. 71503/01, 39 Eur. H.R. Rep. 32, 138-
145 (2004). This is a more recent case, in which the Court used the phrases "overall
control," "effective control" and "effective overall control."
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through NATO. 54 It was noted in the judgment that there had
not been any NATO ground troops in place at the time and the
Court seemed to reason that aerial dominance was not sufficient
to trigger the application of the Convention.55 The Court held
that it had only recognized the extraterritorial application of the
European Convention:
[When the respondent State, through the effective control of the
relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of
military occupation or through the consent, invitation or acquiescence
of the Government of that territory, exercises all or some of the public
powers normally to be exercised by that Government.
56
In the proceedings before the European Court brought on behalf
of Saddam Hussein, the Court rejected the argument that the
necessary control existed simply by virtue of membership in a
coalition where one member of that coalition may have violated
the rights of a particular individual under its control.
5 7
The Court of Appeal in Al-Skeini, in denying that the
United Kingdom exercised effective control in Basrah, reviewed
the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence and found that with
regard to Northern Cyprus, "[iut was obvious from the fact that
more than 30,000 Turkish military personnel were engaged in
active duties [there] that her army exercised effective control
over that part of the island."58 The claimants' argument that, as
an occupying power, the United Kingdom was in effective
control of the parts of Iraq it occupied for the application of
human rights obligations, did not persuade either of the Al-
Skeini Courts.59 The Secretary of State had recognized the
occupier status of the United Kingdom in the relevant parts of
southern Iraq, and both Courts accepted this proposition
without questioning whether indeed sufficient control was
exercised by British troops for the purpose of occupation. There
are obvious similarities between the requirement of "effective
54. Bankovi6 v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, Eur. Ct. H.R., IT 74-82 (2001).
55. Id. IT 52, 74-76.
56. Id. 71. For a critique of the decision see Kerem Altiparmak, Bankovic: An
Obstacle to the Application of the European Convention on Human Rights in Iraq?, 9
J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 213; Martin Scheinin, Extraterritorial Effect of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 73, 77-80 (Fons Coomans & Menno T.
Kamminga eds., 2004).
57. Hussein v. 21 States, App. No. 23276/04, 42 Eur. H.R. Rep. SE16 at 223,
224-25 (Mar. 14, 2006) (Court Decision on Admissibility).
58. A1-Skeini v. Sec'y of State for Def., [2005] EWCA (Civ) 1609, [671, 2006 3
W.L.R. 508 (U.K.).
59. See id. 127. But see Williams, supra note 47, at 726.
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control" for the application of human rights treaties and the
conditions to be satisfied under the laws of armed conflict for a
State to be considered an occupying power.
Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations, comprising a rule
of customary international law, provides that "[t]erritory is
considered occupied when it is actually placed under the
authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to
the territory where such authority has been established and can
be exercised."60 Article 43 of the Regulations speaks of "[tihe
authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the
hands of the occupant," and stipulates that "the latter shall take
all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as
possible, public order and safety."61  The Fourth Geneva
Convention of 1949 does not depart from this definition, but
grants a broader protection to civilians by protecting them as
soon as they fall into the hands of a Party to the conflict or an
Occupying Power "of which they are not nationals."62 The
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia has
provided some useful guidelines for determining the existence of
an occupation:
[1.] the occupying power must be in a position to substitute its own
authority for that of the occupied authorities, which must have been
rendered incapable of functioning publicly;
[2.] the enemy's forces have surrendered, been defeated or withdrawn.
In this respect, battle areas may not be considered as occupied
territory. However, sporadic local resistance, even successful, does not
affect the reality of occupation;
[3.1 the occupying power has a sufficient force present, or the capacity
to send troops within a reasonable time to make the authority of the
occupying power felt; [and]
[4.] a temporary administration has been established over the
territory;
60. Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 42,
annexed to Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 19, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. The
Regulations were seen as a codification of customary international law by the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. International Military Tribunal
(Nuremberg), Judgment and Sentences, 1 Oct. 1946, reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L.
172, 248-49 (1947).
61. Hague Regulations, supra note 60, art. 43.
62. Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, supra note 10, art. 4; see also id. arts. 2, 6; 4 THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: COMMENTARY 59 - 60 (Jean Pictet ed., 1958).
20071
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
the occupying power has issued and enforced directions to the civilian
population.63
The foregoing demonstrates that there are exacting
requirements to be met under international humanitarian law
in order for a State to qualify as an occupying power. This
prompts the question as to whether the authority and control
necessary for an occupation under the laws of armed conflict can
be equated with the "effective control" necessary for the
application of human rights treaties. It is clear that occupations
can vary from peaceful ones, as was the case in Germany after
the Second World War, to highly volatile ones, where occupying
forces may be under sustained attacks.64 If one deems the fact
of occupation as sufficient to meet the effective control
requirement for the purpose of applying human rights treaties
extraterritorially, then it may avoid a situation where an
occupier may seek to reduce the number of troops present in
order to otherwise relinquish any "effective control."65 In the Al-
Skeini proceedings, the Court of Appeal found that the situation
in Basrah was unstable and that it would be contrary to
Coalition policy to maintain more forces in Iraq "when its
overarching policy was to encourage the Iraqis to govern
themselves." 66 In a similar vein, this approach would also
counteract the inclination of an occupying force not to assume
"all or some of the public powers" normally exercised by the
previous government, as required under international
humanitarian law, in order to avoid the application of human
rights obligations.67
It is proposed that rather than dismissing the application of
63. Prosecutor v. Naletilic, Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, 217 (Mar. 31,
2003) (footnotes omitted).
64. See generally Univ. Ctr. for Int'l Humanitarian Law, Expert Meeting on the
Right to Life in Armed Conflicts and Situations of Occupation, Sept. 1-2, 2005,
available at http://www.ucihl.org/communication/RighttoLife-Meeting-Report.pdf
(discussing international humanitarian law and international human rights law and
how they differ when addressing situations of occupation).
65. This would probably violate the occupier's obligation under Article 43 of the
Hague Regulations to maintain public order and safety. See Hague Regulations,
supra note 60, art. 43; Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land art. 43, annexed to Hague Convention (II) Respecting the Laws and Customs
of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803.
66. Al-Skeini v. Sec'y of State for Def., [2005] EWCA (Civ) 1609, [125] (Eng.),
[2006] 3 W.L.R. 508.
67. Rick Lawson, Life After Bankovic: On the Extraterritorial Application of the
European Convention on Human Rights, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES, supra note 9, at 83, 111.
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the European Convention and the Human Rights Act on the
basis of the volatility of the situation in and around Basrah, this
issue could have been taken into consideration in the
determination of whether there had been a violation of a
substantive right. If serious hostilities were to resume in an
area under occupation, the conduct of armed forces could then
be assessed solely under humanitarian law. Rather than
allowing for the non-applicability of human rights law outright
in such a circumstance, such a lack of stability could then be
considered in the assessment of whether particular rights have
been violated. This solution would avoid the blanket rejection of
any human rights obligations, on the basis of a general lack of
control, while also taking into consideration genuine security
and military concerns of an occupying force.
The International Court of Justice seems to have adopted
such an approach in recent times, holding that during a
situation of occupation, a State's human rights obligations
automatically apply. In its judgment in Democratic Republic of
Congo v. Uganda, the Court found that Uganda was bound by
its human rights obligations in those parts of the DRC where it
could be considered an occupying power, i.e., where its armed
forces were stationed and "had substituted their own authority
for that of the Congolese Government."68 The Court held that
an occupying power's obligations under Article 43 of the Hague
Regulations "comprised the duty to secure respect for the
applicable rules of international human rights law and
international humanitarian law, to protect the inhabitants of
the occupied territory against acts of violence, and not to
tolerate such violence by any third party."69 The Human Rights
Committee has held that in 1991 Iraq had a "clear responsibility
under international law for the observance of human rights
during its occupation of [Kuwait] ."7
This approach holds considerable merit because of the
68. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Uganda), 173 (Judgment of Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/ico/icoframe.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2007).
69. Id. 178.
70. Human Rights Committee, Report of the Human Rights Committee, 652,
U.N. Doc. A/46/40 (Oct. 10, 1991). One could also apply such an interpretation to the
Human Rights Committee's observations with regard to Israel's obligations vis-&-vis
the territories it occupies: "[T]he Covenant must be held applicable to the occupied
territories and those areas of southern Lebanon and West Bekaa where Israel
exercises effective control." Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee: Israel, supra note 51, 10.
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highly unique nature of occupation, with the previous power
having been displaced and "the occupier ha[ving], effectively,
denied the opportunity for the citizens of that territory to rely
upon their own State to protect their human rights."71 The
comparison can readily be made with the situation of a non-
international armed conflict occurring within a State's own
borders in which a non-State armed group exercises control over
territory.72 This is currently the case in Colombia, and while the
Colombian State may not be able to fully live up to its human
rights obligations in the area controlled by FARC, given that it
no longer exercises effective control there, it could not deny
outright the application of its human rights obligations to the
citizens residing there.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the ongoing "war on terror," powerful States have acted
in disregard of many of the cardinal principles- nf international
l.w. RueCa laid down in the Charter of the United Nations, the
Universal Declaration of Human Right, and the 1949 Geneva
Conventions have been sidelined in the pursuit of the
amorphous goals of this seemingly never-ending venture.
Despite these violations, and the attempts to undermine
international law itself, the legal norms applicable to recent
events have demonstrated resilience, and persevering human
rights litigation has begun to yield results for victims of the
"war on terror." Relatives of those killed by British soldiers in
Iraq have had some success in utilizing the Human Rights Act
of 1998 and the European Convention on Human Rights to seek
redress for those deaths. The continuing Al-Skeini proceedings,
and the potential for further cases,73 have helped to progress
71. ROWE, supra note 23, at 128.
72. Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions only applies to
conflicts in which the non-State armed groups, inter alia, "exercise[s] such control
over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted
military operations and to implement this Protocol." Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 1, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
609. The authoritative Commentary to the Additional Protocols asserts that the
territory which the non-State group can claim to control will generally be that
"which escapes the control of the government armed forces." CLAUDE PILLOUD,
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 1353 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, &
Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987).
73. Mattew Hickley, 'Soldiers face a flood of human rights lawsuits', The Daily
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both the debate and the law on the extraterritorial application
of human rights law in times of armed conflict.
The application of human rights law beyond a State's own
borders has arisen primarily because of the errant behaviour of
those States and the straightforward interpretation of the
jurisdictional provisions of various human rights treaties by
their monitoring bodies. Additionally, in times of armed
conflict, human rights law can provide better avenues of redress
than international humanitarian law, given that the two
primary avenues for accountability under the latter, inter-State
proceedings and the trial of individual offenders, "cannot be
accessed directly by individuals."74  Many violations of
international humanitarian law would not reach the level of
gravity necessary to come before international tribunals, such
as the International Criminal Court.75 Human rights law also
works in a complementary way to international humanitarian
law when it comes to issues such as fair trial, detention, and the
protection of life. Its application in times of armed conflict
furthermore avoids any gaps in legal protection and allows for
"consistent rule of law coverage." 76  Utilization of the
mechanisms provided for under international human rights law
can in theory provide more than just a civil remedy for violative
conduct-a lawyer acting for the relatives in the Bankovi6
proceedings articulated that the principal concern of the victims
was "to establish truth and accountability. '77
This article has demonstrated some of the remaining
challenges presented by applying human rights law
extraterritorially in times of armed conflict. The meaning of
"effective control," in particular, continues to generate
disagreement and it is proposed that in order to enhance the
protection of the rights of a civilian population under
occupation, this "effective control" requirement is automatically
Mail, 22 December 2005, p. 25; Christopher Booker, 'How Blair is destroying our
Forces', The Sunday Telegraph, 18 June 2006, p. 14.
74. Emanuela-Chiara Gillard, International Humanitarian Law and
Extraterritorial State Conduct, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES, supra note 9, at 25, 37.
75. Article 8 of the Rome Statute states that "[tihe Court shall have jurisdiction
in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or
as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes." Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, supra note 11, art. 8.
76. Fionnuala Ni Aoldin, The No-Gaps Approach to Parallel Application in the
Context of the War on Terror, ISRAEL L. REV. (forthcoming 2007).
77. Natasha Joffe, Law: At War with NATO, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 23,
2001, at 16.
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satisfied where an occupation exists under international
humanitarian law. Although the intricacies of the relationship
between international human rights law and international
humanitarian law need to be fully worked out, by and large, the
principle that human rights law has extraterritorial application
in times of armed conflict is now well-established. Although
this development preceded the attacks of September 11, events
in the "war on terror" have contributed to the advancement of
this important step forward in the protection of human rights.
